



Philippine Electricity  
Market Corporation

# **WESM PRICE DETERMINATION METHODOLOGY**

*Expository Presentation*

**20 September 2017**

**MinDA Office, Davao City**

# OUTLINE




## BACKGROUND



## DESIGN ENHANCEMENTS



## PRICE DETERMINATION METHODOLOGY (PDM) AMENDMENTS




## SUMMARY



# BACKGROUND


# BACKGROUND

How is power delivered to customers?



# BACKGROUND

## Supply and Demand Balancing




- *Instantaneous production and consumption*
- *Cannot be economically stored*



...requires a corresponding real-time increase in generation, and vice versa.

Demand increase...



Real-time centralized  
scheduling and  
balancing of supply  
and demand



Market Operator



Market-based  
Scheduling



Balancing

System Operator



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# BACKGROUND

## Transition to competitive regime



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WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY  
SPOT MARKET  
PROGRESS  
2006 - 2016

### Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA)

#### Declaration of Policy

“(c) Transparent and reasonable prices ... in a regime of free and fair competition ... to achieve greater operational and economic efficiency


(d) To enhance the inflow of private capital and broaden the ownership base of the power generation”



# BACKGROUND

## Scheduling

### Interim Dispatch Protocol



### Challenges

- Cheaper available capacities may not be fully utilized due to contracts
- Customers with contract deficiencies cannot source from other available generators
- Generation for system security reasons is shouldered by counterparty


- Customers may re-nominate contracts
- Real-time variations are addressed by reserves

# BACKGROUND

## Scheduling

### WESM

#### Outside the Market



#### Features

- All capacities are optimized to serve all demand
- Generation for system security reasons is shared by whole region



Send  
schedules



- Forecast demand
- Schedule generation based on offers



# BACKGROUND

## Benefits of WESM

### System-Optimized Schedules

- Current optimization of individual contract portfolios result in suboptimal system generation mix
- WESM optimizes generation cost for whole system

### Full Availability of Capacities



- Generators currently only dispatch to serve their counterparties
- In the WESM, generators can be dispatched to serve any demand
- Any generation can be utilized in the WESM to address congestion

### Transparent and Shared Security and Reliability Costs

- Security-based dispatch is currently shouldered by counterparties of generators
- In the WESM, costs to address security concerns are made transparent and shared by the whole region

# BACKGROUND

## WESM Scheduling with Mindanao



*The WESM simultaneously determines schedules and prices for the whole system. Mindanao results will initially be based only on market outcomes in Mindanao prior to the interconnection.*

# BACKGROUND

## Trading in the WESM

### Generators



Ensure availability of generating units

Submit offers for scheduling

If any, declare bilateral contract quantities

Settled for production not covered by contracts

### Customers



Optimize energy sourcing from contracts and WESM

Utilize electricity

*(No bidding is required to buy from the WESM)*

If any, confirm bilateral contract quantities


Settle consumption not covered by contracts and, if applicable, losses & congestion

Outside the market



# BACKGROUND

## Milestones



# BACKGROUND


## Guiding Principles

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- Gross Pool
- Locational Marginal Pricing / Nodal Pricing
- Net Settlement
- Energy and Reserve Co-optimization
- Demand Bidding
- Self commitment
- Rules-based

# BACKGROUND

## Structure





# WESM DESIGN ENHANCEMENTS

# WESM DESIGN ENHANCEMENTS

## Developments

2013: Market Study conducted by IES

- 19 public consultations

2014: Market Study submitted to DOE

2015: DOE Department Circular No. DC2015-10-0015

- Established the guiding principles for the WESM design enhancements
- Mandated amendments to the WESM Rules through the rules change process

2016: DOE Department Circular No. DC2016-10-0014

- Approved amendments to the WESM Rules

2017: DOE Department Circular No. DC2017-03-0001

- Approved amendments to the Price Determination Methodology and Constraints Violation Coefficients and Pricing Re-runs Manual



# WESM DESIGN ENHANCEMENTS

## Purpose

### Issue

### Enhancement

Large intra-hour dispatch deviation

Reduce dispatch interval to 5 minutes from 1 hour

Enhancements are consistent with Guiding Principles, and target market efficiency and transparency

Ex-ante pricing only

Non-availability of settlement-ready prices in near real-time

Automatic pricing re-run  
Timely provision of other prices

Mandatory dispatching of generators at their Pmin level

Economic scheduling of Pmin



# **WESM PRICE DETERMINATION METHODOLOGY (PDM) AMENDMENTS**

# BACKGROUND


## Price Determination Methodology

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- Provides the specific details on how the dispatch schedules and locational marginal prices are calculated in the Market Dispatch Optimization Model (MDOM)
  - Includes price substitution methodology in cases of extreme nodal price separation
  - Pricing during market intervention and suspension
- Calculation of settlement amounts net of bilateral contracts


# REVISED PDM MANUAL STRUCTURE

## Contents




# SUMMARY OF ENHANCEMENTS TO THE PDM

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
# SUMMARY OF ENHANCEMENTS TO THE PDM

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
# MARKET DISPATCH OPTIMIZATION MODEL (MDOM)

## Overview



# MDOM

## MDOM Input – Load Forecast






# MDOM Input – Market Network Model



# MARKET DISPATCH OPTIMIZATION MODEL (MDOM)

## Overview



### Objective

- *Maximize the value of dispatched load*
- While *minimizing cost* of dispatched generation, dispatched reserves, and constraint violations

### Subject to

- Energy and reserve requirements
- Transmission system capabilities
- Individual technical capabilities of resources

# MDOM


## Detailed Formulation of the Objective Function

WESM Rules Clause 3.6.1.3	Mathematical Representation
Maximize <b>value of dispatched load</b> based on dispatch bids, minus	$\sum_i^n \left\{ \sum_b^{E_D} [(DB_{b,i})(PDB_{b,i})] \right\}$
<b>Cost of dispatched generation</b> based on dispatched offers	$- \sum_k^{E_G} [(G_{k,i})(PG_{k,i})]$
<b>Cost of dispatched reserves</b> based on reserves contracted for or when applicable reserve offers	$- \sum_r^{N_R} \sum_j^{E_R} [(R_{j,r,i})(PR_{j,r,i})]$
<b>Cost of constraint violation</b> based on the constraint violation coefficients.	$- \sum_c^{E_C} [(CQ_{c,i})(CP_{c,i})] - \sum CVP \}$
<i>Subscripts</i>	<p><b>Curtailment price can be set per node</b></p> <p> <i>i</i> – dispatch interval  <i>b</i> – demand bid block  <i>k</i> – generation offer block  <i>j</i> – reserve offer block  <i>r</i> – reserve category  <i>c</i> – curtailment quantity         </p>



# MDOM

## Objective Function



# MDOM

## Detailed Constraints

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### a. System Constraints

- i. System power balance
- ii. Reserve region requirements
- iii. Reserve provider capacity cap
- iv. AC power flow, including the network loss model and power flow limits
- v. HVDC flow limit
- vi. Nodal energy balance constraint

### b. Generic Constraints

- i. Over-riding Constraints
  - Security Limit
  - Transmission Limit
- ii. Outage schedule
- iii. Contingency list

### c. Resource Constraints

- i. Generator resource energy constraint
- ii. Load resource energy constraint
- iii. Reserve resource constraint
- iv. Combined energy and reserve capacity limit
- v. Combined energy and reserve ramping
- vi. Constraints that pertain to the operational modes of generators, loads or similar facilities (e.g., battery energy storage systems, pump storage hydro)

# MDOM


## Sample Constraints

System Power Balance:

$$\text{Generation} = \text{Load} + \text{Losses}$$

Transfer Capacity = 300 MW

Power Flow Limit



Offer: 300 MW @ P 3,000 / MWh

250 MW



Generator resource energy constraint

Nodal energy balance constraint

# MDOM

## Priority-scheduling


- ❑ When restricting dispatch schedules, following hierarchy shall be followed:
- Market offers of scheduled generating units;
  - Non-scheduled generating units<sup>1</sup>;
  - Priority dispatch generating units<sup>2</sup>; and
  - Must dispatch generating units<sup>3</sup>.





# MARKET DISPATCH OPTIMIZATION MODEL (MDOM)


## Overview



# MDOM

## Projections and Real-Time Dispatch (RTD) Timetable


### Week-Ahead Projections (once a day)



### Day-Ahead Projections (hourly)



### Hour-Ahead Projections (every five minutes)



### Real-Time Dispatch (every five minutes)

Per dispatch interval scheduling and pricing



# MDOM


## Reserves

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- Categories
  - Regulation (Secondary) - Raise/Lower
  - Contingency (Primary & Tertiary) - Raise/Lower
- Reserve Regions
  - Luzon
  - Visayas
  - Mindanao


# RESERVES

## Reserve Categories [Distinction between Raise and Lower Reserves]



# SUMMARY OF ENHANCEMENTS TO THE PDM

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# MARKET PRICING RE-RUNS

## Overview

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- Prices reflecting constraint violation penalties are not settled, and are re-run
- In the current system, high level of PENs issued, and settlement ready prices are ready only at the end of the billing month
- Automatic re-run of prices enable availability of settlement ready prices near real time

# MARKET PRICING RE-RUNS

## Constraint Violation Coefficients

Order	Constraint Violation Coefficient Name	CVC
1	Delayed Contingency Reserve Requirement	100,000
2	Slow Contingency Reserve Requirement	200,000
3	Fast Contingency Reserve Requirement	400,000
4	Nodal Value of Lost Load or Nodal Energy Balance Constraint	800,000
5	System Energy Balance Constraint	1,300,000
6	Self-Scheduled Generation Constraint	1,400,000
7	Thermal Contingency Constraint	2,400,000
8	Regulating Reserve Requirement	2,800,000
9	Transmission Group Constraint	2,900,000
10	Thermal Base Case Constraint	3,000,000

Lowest Priority in Meeting Requirement



Highest Priority in Meeting Requirement

# MARKET PRICING RE-RUNS

## How is it done?

---

- The **automatic pricing re-run of the MDOM** shall determine the prices for energy and reserves with **relaxed constraints** and shall have approximately the same dispatch schedules.
- Shortage and Excess Pricing
  - For under-generation, the shortage price shall be determined as the offer price cap.
  - For over-generation, the excess price shall be determined as the offer price floor.
- Manual re-runs done only for errors due to erroneous input data




# MARKET PRICING RE-RUNS

Scheduling Run




Pricing Run




# MARKET PRICING RE-RUNS

Scheduling Run




Pricing Run




# MARKET PRICING RE-RUNS

Scheduling Run




Pricing Run




# MARKET PRICING RE-RUNS

## Timeline

### Current




### New Process



# SUMMARY OF ENHANCEMENTS TO THE PDM

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# PRICE SUBSTITUTION METHODOLOGY (PSM)

## Overview

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
- This methodology addresses **occurrence of extreme nodal price separation** arising from **the effects of network congestion** in the power system
- If a dispatch interval is reflective of extreme nodal price separation due to network congestion, then prices shall be substituted for the affected generators and customers.
- Proposed PSM uses the same principles as the original, but ensures that there are settlement ready prices available near real time

# PRICE SUBSTITUTION METHODOLOGY (PSM)

## Example

Offer: 50 MW @ PhP 2,000 / MWh


Offer: 300 MW @ PhP 3,000 / MWh



# PRICE SUBSTITUTION METHODOLOGY (PSM)

## Overview


- When is PSM applied?





# PRICE SUBSTITUTION METHODOLOGY

## Trigger Factor



# PRICE SUBSTITUTION METHODOLOGY (PSM)

## Example

Offer: 50 MW @ PhP 2,000 / MWh

Offer: 300 MW @ PhP 3,000 / MWh



Schedule: 50 MW  
LMP: PhP 4,986 / MWh



Schedule: 24 MW  
LMP: PhP 3,000 / MWh

### Step 1: Calculate NWAP

$$NWAP = \frac{\sum(LMP \times Schedule)}{\sum Schedule}$$

$$NWAP = \frac{4,986 \times 50 + 7,000 \times 232 + 3,000 \times 24 + 9,379 \times 300}{50 + 24 + 232 + 300}$$

$$NWAP = \text{PhP } 7,853/\text{MWh}$$



Offer: 300 MW @ PhP 7,000 / MWh

Schedule: 232 MW  
LMP: PhP 7,000 / MWh



Demand: 300 MW

Schedule: 300 MW  
LMP: PhP 9,379 / MWh

# PRICE SUBSTITUTION METHODOLOGY (PSM)

## Example

Offer: 50 MW @ PhP 2,000 / MWh

Offer: 300 MW @ PhP 3,000 / MWh

G1

Schedule: 50 MW  
LMP: PhP 4,986 / MWh

G3

Schedule: 24 MW  
LMP: PhP 3,000 / MWh

### Step 2: Calculate Trigger Factor

$$TF = \frac{\sqrt{\frac{\sum [\text{Schedule} \times (\text{LMP} - \text{NWAP})^2]}{\sum \text{Schedule}}}}{\text{NWAP}}$$

$$TF = \frac{1,744}{7,853} = 0.22$$

Demand: 300 MW

Offer: 300 MW @ PhP 7,000 / MWh

Schedule: 232 MW  
LMP: PhP 7,000 / MWh

Schedule: 300 MW  
LMP: PhP 9,379 / MWh

# PRICE SUBSTITUTION METHODOLOGY (PSM)

## Example

Offer: 50 MW @ PhP 2,000 / MWh

Offer: 300 MW @ PhP 3,000 / MWh



Schedule: 50 MW  
LMP: PhP 4,986 / MWh



Schedule: 24 MW  
LMP: PhP 3,000 / MWh

### Step 3: Compare with threshold

$$TF = \frac{1,744}{7,853} = 0.22 \geq 0.20$$

*This scenario would undergo PSM*



Offer: 300 MW @ PhP 7,000 / MWh

Schedule: 232 MW  
LMP: PhP 7,000 / MWh



Demand: 300 MW

Schedule: 300 MW  
LMP: PhP 9,379 / MWh

# PRICE SUBSTITUTION METHODOLOGY (PSM)


Feature	Methodology
<b>Pricing of Generators</b>	<p>Generators dispatched to address congestion ( Constrained-On Generator's )– Pay-as-Bid</p> <p>Other Generators– Unconstrained Market Clearing Price</p>
<b>Pricing of Customers</b>	<p>Single load price is computed in real-time based on the allocation of the estimated total generation cost based on schedule</p>

# PRICE SUBSTITUTION METHODOLOGY (PSM)

## Example

Offer: 50 MW @ PhP 2,000 / MWh

Offer: 300 MW @ PhP 3,000 / MWh



# PRICE SUBSTITUTION METHODOLOGY (PSM)

## Example

Participant	Schedule (MW)	Substitute Energy Dispatch Price (PhP / MWh)
G1 (Unconstrained)	50	3,000
G2 (Constrained-on)	232	7,000
G3 (Unconstrained)	24	3,000
Load	300	?

$$\text{Load SEDP} = \frac{\sum (\text{SEDP}_{\text{Gen}} \times \text{Schedule}_{\text{Gen}})}{\sum \text{Schedule}_{\text{Load}}}$$

$$\text{Load SEDP} = \frac{50 \times 3,000 + 232 \times 7,000 + 24 \times 3,000}{300}$$

$$\text{Load SEDP} = \text{PhP } 6,153/\text{MWh}$$

# PRICE SUBSTITUTION METHODOLOGY (PSM)

## Example

Comparison of original and substitute prices:


Participant	Schedule (MW)	Original Price (PhP / MWh)	Substitute Energy Dispatch Price (PhP / MWh)
G1 (Unconstrained)	50	4,986	3,000
G2 (Constrained-on)	232	7,000	7,000
G3 (Unconstrained)	24	3,000	3,000
Load	300	9,379	6,153




# PRICE SUBSTITUTION METHODOLOGY (PSM)

## Timeline

### Current




### New Process



# SUMMARY OF ENHANCEMENTS TO THE PDM

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# ADMINISTERED PRICE (AP)

## Overview

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- Administered prices are used when market intervention or market suspension is declared
- Proposed methodology uses the same principles as the current but allows AP prices to be available near real-time
- Further adjustments to the methodology were made on imports from regions, when one region is not under market intervention or suspension

# ADMINISTERED PRICE (AP)

## Generator Administered Price

	Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
Week-4			Hour 09	<div> Administered price = Weighted-average of settlement prices  <i>*Weighted using snapshot quantities</i> </div>			
Week-3			Hour 09				
Week-2			Hour 09				
Week-1			Hour 09				
Week			Hour 09				

Interval under suspension / intervention

# ADMINISTERED PRICE (AP)

## Generator Administered Price - Example

Settlement Price		Snapshot	
W	FEDP (PhP/MWh)	SQ (MW)	FEDP x SQ
Week-4	5,670	15	85,050
Week-3	4,438	13	57,694
Week-2	4,149	11	45,639
Week-1	4,140	15	62,100
<b>TOT</b>	--	<b>54</b>	<b>250,483</b>

$$\text{Administered Price}_w = \frac{\sum (\text{FEDP} \times \text{SQ})}{\sum \text{SQ}}$$

$$\frac{250,483}{54}$$

$$\text{Administered Price}_w = \text{PhP } 4,639 / \text{MWh}$$

# ADMINISTERED PRICE (AP)

## Load Administered Price

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
$$\text{Load Administered Price} = \frac{\text{Generation Cost}}{\text{Total Generation}}$$



$$\begin{aligned} &\text{Load Administered Price} \\ &= \frac{\text{Total (Generator Administered Price} \times \text{Snapshot)}}{\text{Total Generation MW Snapshot}} \end{aligned}$$

# ADMINISTERED PRICE (AP)

## Customer Administered Price - Example



$$\text{Administered Price}_{\text{Load}} = \frac{\sum (\text{AP}_{\text{Gen}} \times \text{SQ}_{\text{Gen}})}{\text{Total SQ}_{\text{Load}}}$$

$$\text{Administered Price}_{\text{Load}} = \frac{4,639 \times 100 + 4,996 \times 50}{148}$$

$$\text{Administered Price}_{\text{Load}} = \text{PhP } 4,822/\text{MWh}$$

# ADMINISTERED PRICE (AP)

## Other features


Case	Methodology
Intervention / Suspension was declared and there is a newly modelled generator	Based on weighted-average price of other administered generators
Reserves	<i>Similar to energy administered price</i>  Based on the schedule weighted average of the reserve prices for each reserve category of the 4 most recent similar trading day and similar dispatch intervals that have not been administered.



# ADMINISTERED PRICE (AP)

## Regional Application


- The administered price shall be applied in the region where the market suspension or market intervention is declared.
- For this purpose, the regions are Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao.
- If there is an interconnection, the actual flow in the interconnection shall be considered in the customer allocation.




# ADMINISTERED PRICE (AP)

## Timeline

### Current




### New Process



# SUMMARY OF ENHANCEMENTS TO THE PDM

---



# MUST-RUN UNITS

## Overview

---

- Used address a threat in system security when all available ancillary services have been exhausted
- Criteria:
  - System Voltage Requirement
  - Thermal Limits
  - Real Power Balancing and Frequency Control
- Change in methodology driven by the need to produce settlement ready prices near real-time.

# MUST-RUN UNITS


## Compensation

---

- Market price (price taker)
- If necessary, additional compensation to cover variable costs

# SUMMARY OF ENHANCEMENTS TO THE PDM

---



# SETTLEMENT CALCULATIONS


## Overview

---

- Changes in the settlement calculations are driven by shortening of dispatch interval and ex ante only pricing, and the amendments to the pricing methodologies
- Resulting amendment provides for settlement calculations that are simplified and uniform
- Reserve cost recovery is included in the PDM

# SETTLEMENT CALCULATIONS


## Final Energy Dispatch Price (FEDP)





# SETTLEMENT CALCULATIONS


Enhanced



# SETTLEMENT CALCULATIONS

## Enhanced – Energy Trading Amount

### Settlement Inputs



Per dispatch interval (5-minutes),

Energy Trading Amount =

$$MQ \times FEDP - BCQ \times FEDP_{@RefNode}$$

# SETTLEMENT CALCULATIONS

## Enhanced – Energy Trading Amount (Example)




PART	MQ [A]	BCQ [B]	FEDP [C]	FEDP@RefNode [D]	ETA [A C- B D]
G1	252	150	3,000	3,000	306,300
G2	103	50	5,000	5,102	259,924
L1	(150)	(150)	3,046	3,000	(6,827)
L2	(200)	(50)	5,102	5,102	(765,230)
NET					(205,833)

Net Settlement Surplus

# SETTLEMENT CALCULATIONS

## Enhanced – Net Settlement Surplus

Parameter	Proposed
Line Loss and Congestion Cost	Based on actual marginal loss and congestion cost
Cost of Line Loss and Congestion associated with Bilateral Contracts	Accounted to actual payer based on contract delivery point
Generator	Receives NSS if payment is less than the lower clearing price
Load	Receives full NSS if payment is more than the lower clearing price




# SETTLEMENT CALCULATIONS

## Enhanced – Net Settlement Surplus




Net Settlement  
Surplus




Allocate based on  
line loss and  
congestion cost  
(LLCC) payments

$$LLCC = MQ \times LLCP - BCQ \times LLCP_{@RefNode}$$



# SETTLEMENT CALCULATIONS


## Enhanced – Net Settlement Surplus (Example)



PART	MQ [A]	BCQ [B]	LLCP [C]	LLCP@RefNode [D]	LLCC* [E=A C- B D]	NSS Alloc. [NSS E/TOTAL E]
G1	252	150	0	0	0	0
G2	103	50	2,000	2,102	0	0
L1	(150)	(150)	46	0	(6,827)	4,363
L2	(200)	(50)	2,102	2,102	(315,230)	201,470
	5	0			(322,056)	205,833

# SETTLEMENT CALCULATIONS

Enhanced




PART	ETA [A]	NSS Alloc. [B]	Energy Settlement Amount [C]
G1	306,300	0	306,300
G2	259,924	0	259,924
L1	(6,827)	4,363	(2,464)
L2	(765,230)	201,470	(563,760)
TOT	(205,833)	205,833	0

No amount remaining with the Market Operator

# SETTLEMENT CALCULATIONS


Enhanced





# SETTLEMENT CALCULATIONS

## Enhanced – Reserve Trading Amount




# SETTLEMENT CALCULATIONS

## Enhanced – Reserve Trading Amount (example)


Reserve Dispatch

Price =  
PhP 2,000 / MWh




# SETTLEMENT CALCULATIONS

## Enhanced – Reserve Cost Recovery



# SETTLEMENT CALCULATIONS

## Enhanced – Reserve Cost Recovery (example)




	Cost (PhP)
Raise	20,000
Lower	10,000
<b>TOTAL REGULATION (RR COST)</b>	<b>30,000</b>

	Metered Quantity, MQ (MWh)	Cost Recovery Amount (PhP) $\frac{MQ}{TOTAL\ MQ} \times RR\ COST$
G1	252	(10,726)
G2	103	(4,382)
L1	150	(6,382)
L2	20	(8,509)
<b>TOT</b>	<b>705</b>	<b>(30,000)</b>


# SETTLEMENT CALCULATIONS

## Enhanced – Reserve Cost Recovery (example)



# SETTLEMENT CALCULATIONS

## Enhanced – Reserve Cost Recovery (example)



# SETTLEMENT CALCULATIONS

## Enhanced – Reserve Cost Recovery (example)



Ex. RDP = PhP 2,500 / MWh

**For common block 1 (100 MW),**

$$RTA_{CB1} = 100 \times 2,500 \times 1 / 12 = \text{PhP } 20,833$$

$$RCRA_{CB1} = 20,833 \times 1 / 2 = \text{PhP } 10,417$$


**For common block 2 (150 MW),**

$$RTA_{CB2} = 150 \times 2,500 \times 1 / 12 = \text{PhP } 31,250$$

$$RCRA_{CB2} = 31,250 \times 1 = \text{PhP } 31,250$$

# SETTLEMENT CALCULATIONS

## Enhanced – Reserve Cost Recovery (example)



Cost Recovery =  
Amount

Category	Cost Recovery Amount
G1	PhP 41,667
G2	PhP 10,417



# SETTLEMENT CALCULATIONS

## Enhanced – Reserve Cost Recovery (example)




	Cost (PhP)
CONTINGENCY- LOWER (CL COST)	20,000

	Metered Quantity, MQ (MWh)	Cost Recovery Amount (PhP) $\frac{\text{CUS MQ}}{\text{TOTAL CUS MQ}} \times \text{CL COST}$
G1	252	N/A
G2	103	N/A
L1	150	(8,571)
L2	20	(11,429)
TOT	705	(20,000)

# SETTLEMENT AMOUNT

## Enhanced WESM Design



# SETTLEMENT AMOUNT

## Enhanced WESM Design

---

Settlement  
Amount

= Trading Amounts +

Other Trading Amounts –

Market Fees



# SUMMARY

# SUMMARY

FEATURE	DESCRIPTION
Dispatch Interval	5 minutes
Pricing	Ex-ante only
Market Re-runs	Automatic pricing re-runs
Consideration of Pmin	Submitted as offer
Scheduling/ Trading of Energy and Reserves	Co-optimized energy and reserves
Settlements	5-minute metered quantity multiplied by price
Administered Prices	Based on historical prices
PSM Settlement	Based on unconstrained prices
MRU Settlement	Market price plus additional compensation



**DAGHANG SALAMAT**

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# GUIDING PRINCIPLES

## Gross pool

- All energy is scheduled through the WESM (i.e., mandatory market)



# GUIDING PRINCIPLES

## Locational Marginal Pricing / Nodal Pricing

- Marginal price is computed at each node or location in the power system to reflect transmission line loss or congestion, or both.

LMP =


**System Marginal Price +**  
**Cost of Losses +**  
**Congestion Cost**

Zamboanga  
Market Trading Node

General Santos  
Trading Node

Cagayan de Oro City  
Market Trading Node

Davao  
Market Trading Node





# GUIDING PRINCIPLES

## Locational Marginal Pricing / Nodal Pricing

- Marginal price is computed at each node or location in the power system to reflect transmission line loss or congestion, or both.

LMP =


**System Marginal Price +**  
**Cost of Losses +**  
**Congestion Cost**

**Zamboanga**  
**Market Trading Node**  
**P 2,170 / MWh**

**General Santos**  
**Trading Node**  
**P 2,170 / MWh**

**Cagayan de Oro City**  
**Market Trading Node**  
**P 2,170 / MWh**

**Davao**  
**Market Trading Node**  
**P 2,170 / MWh**



# GUIDING PRINCIPLES

## Locational Marginal Pricing / Nodal Pricing

- Marginal price is computed at each node or location in the power system to reflect transmission line loss or congestion, or both.

LMP =



**System Marginal Price +**  
**Cost of Losses +**  
**Congestion Cost**

**Zamboanga**  
Market Trading Node  
**P 2,170 / MWh**  
**+ P 325 / MWh**

**General Santos**  
Trading Node  
**P 2,170 / MWh**  
**+ P 109 / MWh**

**Cagayan de Oro City**  
Market Trading Node  
**P 2,170 / MWh**  
**+ P 22 / MWh**

**Davao**  
Market Trading Node  
**P 2,170 / MWh**  
**+ P 174 / MWh**



# GUIDING PRINCIPLES

## Locational Marginal Pricing / Nodal Pricing

- Marginal price is computed at each node or location in the power system to reflect transmission line loss or congestion, or both.

LMP =



**System Marginal Price +**  
**Cost of Losses +**  
**Congestion Cost**

**Zamboanga**  
Market Trading Node  
**P 2,170 / MWh**  
**+ P 325 / MWh**  
**+ P 1,000 / MWh**

**General Santos**  
Trading Node  
**P 2,170 / MWh**  
**+ P 109 / MWh**  
**+ P 0 / MWh**

**Cagayan de Oro City**  
Market Trading Node  
**P 2,170 / MWh**  
**+ P 22 / MWh**  
**+ P 0 / MWh**

**Davao**  
Market Trading Node  
**P 2,170 / MWh**  
**+ P 174 / MWh**  
**+ P 0 / MWh**



# GUIDING PRINCIPLES

## Locational Marginal Pricing / Nodal Pricing

- Marginal price is computed at each node or location in the power system to reflect transmission line loss or congestion, or both.

**LMP =**



**System Marginal Price +  
Cost of Losses +  
Congestion Cost**

**Zamboanga  
Market Trading Node  
P 3,495 / MWh**

**General Santos  
Trading Node  
P 2,279 / MWh**

**Cagayan de Oro City  
Market Trading Node  
P 2,192 / MWh**


**Davao  
Market Trading Node  
P 2,344 / MWh**



# GUIDING PRINCIPLES

## Net Settlement



- Participants may declare bilateral contract quantities
- Only spot quantity is settled at market price (nodal)





# GUIDING PRINCIPLES

## Energy and Reserve Co-optimization



### Advantages of Co-Optimized Reserve Market:


- All available capacities can be seen by the WESM
- Determination of optimal schedules and prices between energy and reserves with the least over-all cost
  - Mitigate artificial under-generation



# GUIDING PRINCIPLES


## Demand Bidding

- Customers may submit bids at the price they are willing to pay



*If price > P 10,000 / MWh, schedule NOT to consume 20 MW*


*If price < P 10,000 / MWh, schedule to consume 20 MW*



# GUIDING PRINCIPLES

## Self Commitment

Trading participants are responsible for the management of their ***technical operations, unit commitment decisions*** and ***other market risks*** through submission of offers to the WESM





# GUIDING PRINCIPLES

## RULES-BASED

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**Governing rules are applied to all**



Level  
Playing Field



Consulted  
with  
Stakeholders



Date/Venue	Attendees	Agenda
<b>15-18 April 2013 at PEMC Office</b>	DOE, PEMC, NGCP-SO, and other stakeholders (AES-MPPCL, FGP Corporation, First Gas, MERALCO, NPC, PANASIA, PSALM, SNAP, and SPPC)	Phase 1 issues
<b>17-20 June 2013 at PEMC Office</b>	DOE, PEMC, NGCP-SO, and other stakeholders (Aboitiz Power, AES-MPPCL, AP Renewables, Bac-Man, CEDC, CIP II Power Corp., EDC, First Gas, First Gen, GMCP, Green Core, HEDCOR, Luzon Hydro, Northwind, NPC, One Subic Power, PANASIA, PEDC, Petron, SEM-Calaca, SPC Island Power Corp., SMC Global, SNAP, Therma Luzon, Therma Mobile, Toledo Power Company 1590 EC/Vivant)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Phase 1 findings and recommendations</li> <li>Phase 2 issues</li> </ul>
<b>12-16 August 2013 at PEMC Office</b>	DOE, GMC, ERC, PEMC, WESM Committees, NGCP-SO, and stakeholders (AES-MPPCL, ALECO, AP Renewables, BENECO, CAGELCO I, CANORECO, CASURECO II, CASURECO IV, CEBECO I, CEC, CELCOR, CENECO, DECORP, GUIMELCO, GN Power, IEEC, ILECO II, ILECO III, INEC, LEYECO, LEYECO II, MERALCO, NEECO, NEECO-Area I, PEDC, San Jose City Electric Cooperative, SMEC, SNAP-Benguet Inc., SNAP-Magat Inc., SPC Island Corporation, TARELCO II, VECO)	Phase 2 findings and recommendations
<b>13-15; 19-20 November 2013 at PEMC Office</b>	DOE, ERC, PEMC, WESM Committees, NGCP-SO	Phase 3 recommendations
<b>18 November 2013</b>  <b>Stakeholder's Consultation Meeting at the Development Academy of the Philippines</b>	DOE, DMC, GMC, ERC, PEMC, NGCP-SO, and stakeholders (1590 EC, Aboitiz Power, AES Masinloc, Angeles Power, AP Renewables, BATELEC II, BENECO, CAGELCO I, CAGELCO II, CANORECO, CASURECO II, Clark Electric Distribution Corporation, Dagupan Electric Corporation, EAUC, Ecozone Power Management Inc., FLECO, GN Power, Green Core Geothermal Inc., Guimaras Electric Cooperative, INEC, MERALCO, MOPRECO, MPower, NEECO II– Area I, NEECO– Area II, NORECO I, Northern Renewables, PANASIA, Panay Power Corporation, PENELCO, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, PERC, PSALM, Samar II Electric Cooperative Inc., SMEC, SEM-Calaca, SNAP-Benguet, South Premier Power Corp., SPC Island Power Corp., SPDC, TARELCO II, Tarlac Electric Inc., Team Energy, Therma Luzon, Therma Mobile, Toledo Power Company, TPEC, VECO, Vivant, VRESKO)	Phase 1, Phase 2, and Phase 3 findings and recommendations

